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ARTICLES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
James R. Kibler, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
There were a number of Virginia legislative and judicial devel-
opments in 2002 and 2003 affecting administrative law and pro-
cedure. Legislative studies, updated rulemaking procedures, and
judicial interpretations of agency decisions all affected the prac-
tice of administrative law. Notable changes include the imple-
mentation of fast-track rulemaking, the decision to allow direct
shipment of alcoholic beverages to Virginia residents, and a new
disciplinary standard of simple negligence for licensed health care
practitioners.
This article begins by analyzing selected enactments of the
2003 Session of the General Assembly of Virginia that affect ad-
ministrative law and procedure in the Commonwealth. This arti-
cle also analyzes decisions of Virginia courts dealing with state
administrative procedures decided between June 1, 2002 and
June 1, 2003.
• Partner, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1985, University of Virginia;
J.D., 1993, University of Richmond School of Law, cum laude. The author acknowledges
the Virginia Code Commission's Administrative Law Advisory Committee for its on-line
summaries of developments in the area, the Virginia Bar Association's Administrative
Law Section for its annual summaries of key legislative developments, and both groups for
their joint sponsorship of the Annual Administrative Law Conference. Materials from all
three sources were helpful in the development of this article. The author also wishes to
dedicate this article to The Honorable A. Victor Thomas, a retiring member of the Virginia
House of Delegates, who throughout his career as a legislator admonished agencies (and
the General Assembly) to use common sense.
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II. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A. Legislative Studies
In recent years, the General Assembly has devoted a fair
amount of attention to administrative law. The General Assembly
undertook a complete recodification of former Titles 2.1 and 9 in
2001, following several years of study by the Virginia Code Com-
mission and its Administrative Law Advisory Committee.' Title
2.1, which contained most of the Virginia Code's general provi-
sions relating to the organization of state government, had last
been recodified in 1965.2 Title 9, which included the former Vir-
ginia Administrative Process Act ("VAPA"), had never been re-
codified.3 The VAPA now stands codified in Virginia Code sections
2.2-4000 to 2.2-4031.
4
The Code Commission's Administrative Law Advisory Commit-
tee ("ALAC") adopted a work plan for the year that includes a
proposal to study the use of a central panel of administrative law
judges ("ALJs").5 With few exceptions, Virginia agencies presently
use a system of independent hearing officers that is administered
by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia.6
Hearing officers under the present system are qualified private-
sector attorneys.7 Under the central panel approach, ALJs would
be employees of a state agency and would be assigned to decide
cases in agencies throughout the Commonwealth.' The ALAC
proposed to study whether it would be advisable to clarify and
improve the procedures related to obtaining judicial review of
agency decisions.9
1. REPORT OF THE VA. CODE COMM'N ON RECODIFICATION OF TITLES 2.1 AND 9 OF THE
CODE OF VIRGINIA, H. DOC. 51, at 1 (2001), available at http://legis.state.va.us/ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2003).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-4000 to -4031 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp 2003).
5. See ADMIN. LAW ADVISORY COMM., PROPOSED WORK PLAN 1 (July 17, 2002) [here-
inafter ALAC PLAN], available at http://legis.state.va.us/ (last visited Sep. 22, 2003).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see also REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM'N,
REVIEW OF THE USE OF GRIEVANCE HEARING OFFICERS, H. DOc. 48, at 73-78 (2000) [here-
inafter JLARC REVIEW], available at http://legis.state.va.us/ (last visited Sep. 22, 2003).
9. ALAC PLAN, supra note 5, at 2.
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In 2002 the General Assembly created the Joint Commission on
Administrative Rules ("JCAR")-comprised of twelve legisla-
tors1°-to review existing regulations and agency practices, as
well as regulations being promulgated, and to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor and the General Assembly.11 The JCAR
does not have the power to exercise a legislative "veto." However,
the JCAR may exercise the power, previously held only by the
standing jurisdictional committees of the General Assembly, to
suspend a regulation with the concurrence of the Governor.1 2
The JCAR's power lies in the centralization of political power
in a standing commission, rather than the jurisdictional commit-
tees of the legislature. While it has the power to review all exist-
ing and pending regulations of state agencies, it has no funding
and no new staff. 3 As a result, the JCAR's process is complaint-
driven." Since its inception, the JCAR has reviewed five issues. 5
Two of its interventions are notable for their effect on the regu-
latory process. First, the JCAR reviewed a proposed regulation of
the State Corporation Commission ("SCC") authorizing state-
chartered banks to acquire controlled subsidiaries engaging in
real estate brokerage activities.16 After meeting with the JCAR,
the SCC continued the proceeding to allow the General Assembly
to consider the issues during the 2003 Session and scheduled a
hearing on the proposed regulation. 7 Second, the JCAR issued a
formal objection to the Board of Health's proposed amendments
relating to mass sewage disposal systems." The Governor with-
held approval of the amendments pending attempts by stake-
holders to reach a consensus. 9
10. Act of Apr. 6, 2002, ch. 677, 2002 Va. Acts 976 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-4014, -4015, -4033 (Cum. Supp. 2003); id. §§ 30-73.1 to -73.4 (Cum. Supp.
2003)).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-73.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
12. Id. § 30-73.3(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2003); see also id. §§ 2.2-4014, -4015 (Cum. Supp.
2003).
13. Id. §§ 30-73.1 to -73.4 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
14. Honorable Frank Wagner, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Administrative Law
Conference (Apr. 22, 2003). Wagner is the chairman of the JCAR and a member of the
Senate of Virginia.
15. Id.
16. See 10 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-50 (2003).
17. Wagner, supra note 14.
18. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-610-10 (2003).
19. Wagner, supra note 14.
20031
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B. Statutes
1. Fast-Track Rulemaking
The 2003 General Assembly enacted legislation enabling so-
called "fast-track rulemaking. '2° Ordinarily, a final regulation
may become effective thirty days after it is published in the Vir-
ginia Register of Regulations. 21 Emergency regulations are ex-
empted from the delayed effective date requirement.22 Virginia
Code section 2.2-4012(B), as amended, expands the exemption ac-
corded to emergency regulations by allowing for expedition in the
case of non-controversial, fast-tracked regulations.23
The fast-track law applies to regulations the agency expects to
be non-controversial.24 With the Governor's concurrence and after
notice to the applicable standing committees of the legislature,
the agency may submit a proposed regulation to the Registrar of
Regulations for publication, without having first published a No-
tice of Intended Regulatory Action and without submitting the
proposed regulation to the Department of Planning and Budget
for a forty-five day economic impact analysis.2 ' The proposed
regulation is then subject to the standard sixty-day comment pe-
riod.26 Provided that fewer than ten people, and no member of the
applicable standing legislative committees or the JCAR object,
the regulation becomes effective fifteen days after close of the
public comment period.27 Should such an objection arise, the
agency must publish notice of the objection and proceed with the
remainder of the normal promulgation process, "with the initial
publication of the fast-track regulation serving as the Notice of
Intended Regulatory Action."
21
20. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 224, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-4007, -4012, -4012.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4013(D) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
22. Id. § 2.2-4011(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
23. See id. § 2.2-4012(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
24. Id. § 2.2-4012.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
25. See id. Virginia Code section 2.2-4012.1 exempts fast-tracked rules from the No-
tice of Intended Regulatory Action and economic impact analysis requirements by implica-
tion. Id.
26. See id. § 2.2-4007(F) (Cure. Supp. 2003).
27. See id. § 2.2-4012.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
28. Id.
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2. Beverage Alcohol
The 2003 Session was a good year for Virginia's wineries and
wine lovers. A number of amendments to the Virginia Code
streamlined the regulatory process and, most notably, allowed the
direct shipment of wine and beer to residents of the Common-
wealth.29
The statutory enactments demonstrated a legislative assertion
of policy supremacy on the heels of the decision of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Bolick
v. Roberts.3" There, the court held that Virginia's statutes grant-
ing in-state farm wineries the right to ship wine directly to state
residents, but denying that right to out-of-state wineries, violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.31 The court enjoined the enforcement of a number of Virginia
laws regulating the sale of beverage alcohol that contained the
unconstitutional in-state preference. 2 While the case was on ap-
peal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
the 2003 General Assembly amended the Code to create a limited
right of direct shipment of wine and beer to both in-state and out-
of-state wineries, breweries, and retailers.3 The General Assem-
bly repealed the existing shipment rights and amended the exist-
ing delivery rights of Virginia retailers, wineries, and breweries,
and replaced them with an open permit system.3" Virginia Code
section 4.1-112.1 allows in-state and out-of-state wineries, brew-
eries, and beverage alcohol retailers to apply for a direct shipper's
29. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-132, -207, -212, and -238 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (permitting off-
premises bonded warehouses for Virginia wineries); id. § 4.1-207(5) (Cum. Supp. 2003) (in-
creasing the number of off-premises retail licenses for Virginia farm wineries); id. § 4.1-
201(10) (Cum. Supp. 2003) (permitting inter-winery shipments of wine in closed contain-
ers for manufacturing purposes); id. § 4.1-219 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (granting the Virginia
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services the ability to petition the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board to waive statutory standards for use of on-farm or Virginia-
produced fruit in cases of severe weather or disease infestation).
30. 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002).
31. Id. at 450.
32. See id. at 451.
33. Act of Apr. 9, 2003, ch. 1029, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.1-112.1, -204, -207, -208, -209, -215, -230, -231, and -310 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
34. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-207, -208, -209, and -230 (Cum. Supp. 2003). In-state retail-
ers, breweries, and wineries retain the right to deliver beverage alcohol under their retail
licenses, provided the deliveries are made by the owner or any agent, officer, director,
shareholder, or employee of the licensee. See id. 4.1-207, -208, -209 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
20031
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permit.35 The permit entitles the holder to ship no more than two
cases of wine or beer per month to any person in Virginia to
whom beverage alcohol may be lawfully sold.36 Shipments must
be for personal consumption only, not for resale, and must be
made through a common carrier approved by the Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Board. 37 The statute deems the sales to have occurred
in Virginia and requires collection and remittance of all applica-
ble taxes.38 Moreover, each shipment must be specially marked to
require the signature of an adult, and the common carrier must
be able to refuse delivery when the recipient's age is question-
able.39
The Commonwealth of Virginia asked the Fourth Circuit to va-
cate the decision of the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia in Bolick-arguing that the legislature's
action rendered the case moot, upon the statute's enactment. °
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order and re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of the statutory
enactments and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Beskind v. Eas-
ley, which affirmed a district court's decision that similar North
Carolina statutes were also unconstitutional.4
The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board promulgated emergency
regulations, effective July 10, 2003.42
3. Horse Racing
The Virginia Racing Commission ("Commission"), already pos-
sessing "plenary power" to regulate horse racing with pari-mutuel
wagering in Virginia, ostensibly gained expanded authority in
2003.43 Virginia Code section 59.1-369(5), as amended, grants the
Commission the authority to regulate account wagering, by
"which an individual may establish an account with an entity,
35. Id. § 4.1-112.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
36. Id. § 4.1-112.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
37. Id. § 4.1-112.1(A)-(Cj (Cum. Supp. 2003).
38. Id § 4.1-112.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
39. Id. § 4.1-112.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
40. See Bolick v. Danielson, 330 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2003).
41. 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003); see Bolick, 330 F.3d at 277.
42. See 3 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-40-20 (2003); id. § 5-70-220 (2003).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-369 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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approved by the Commission, to place pari-mutuel wagers in per-
son or electronically."44 The United States Congress authorized
interstate electronic wagering pursuant to the Interstate Horse-
racing Act,4" but until the General Assembly acted, the Virginia
statutes contained no express provision authorizing the Commis-
sion to license entities accepting on-line or telephonic orders and
then placing wagers according to the orders. The new statute re-
quires the Commission to promulgate regulations for the licen-
sure of such entities, and requires licensees to collect revenues
owed to the Commonwealth from such wagers.4"
The General Assembly also gave the Commission expanded au-
thority to regulate the acquisition of an ownership interest in an
entity licensed to own or operate a racetrack or pari-mutuel wa-
gering facility.47 The new statute requires that any person who
proposes to acquire actual control of a licensee must submit to the
Commission specific information designed to permit the Commis-
sion to evaluate whether the licensee will, under the actual con-
trol of the applicant, "have the experience, expertise, financial re-
sponsibility and commitment to comply with" all relevant laws,
regulations, and contractual obligations." The statute requires
the Commission to deny any application to become a partner,
member, or principal stockholder of a licensee, or to acquire ac-
tual control thereof, "if in its judgment the acquisition . . would
be detrimental to the public interest or to the honesty, integrity,
and reputation of racing."49
The Commission gained an exemption from the Government
Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, which generally
restricts the ability of state agencies to collect and disseminate
personal information, and grants individuals the right to access
any such data in the possession of agencies." The new statute ac-
cords the Commission an exemption from those restrictions,
treating data collected by the Commission equally with data col-
lected by the Parole Board, the Crime Commission, the Judicial
44. Id. § 59.1-369(5) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (1996).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-369(5) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
47. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 705, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-386 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-386(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
49. Id. § 59.1-386(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
50. Id. § 2.2-3802 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Inquiry and Review Commission, and the Department of Alco-
holic Beverage Control. 1
4. Health Professions
The General Assembly enacted sweeping reforms to regulations
governing practitioners licensed by health regulatory boards.52
Significantly, the amended Virginia Code sections change the dis-
ciplinary standard from gross negligence to simple negligence.53
Virginia Code section 54.1-2400(14) also seeks to reduce the
number of minor cases requiring a full hearing by giving the
boards a new enforcement tool for minor violations-a confiden-
tial consent agreement that may be used "where there is little or
no injury to a patient or the public and little likelihood of repeti-
tion by the practitioner."5 4 The confidential consent agreement
may not be used in cases where the board concludes "there is
probable cause to believe the practitioner has (i) demonstrated
gross negligence or intentional misconduct in the care of patients
or (ii) conducted his practice in such a manner as to be a danger
to the health and welfare of his patients or the public."55
The General Assembly broadened the Board of Medicine's
mandate to develop ethical guidelines for "physicians practicing
in emergency rooms, surgeons, and interns and residents practic-
ing in hospitals, particularly hospital emergency rooms," and
51. Id.
52. See Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 762, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-27, -125.01 (Cum. Supp. 2003); id. §§ 54.1-111, -2400, -2400.2, -2400.3,
-2401, -2408.2, -2505, -2506, -2506.1, -2906, -2908, -2909, -2911, -2915, and -3480 (Supp.
2003)).
53. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2915(A)(4), -3480(A)(4) (Supp. 2003).
54. Id. § 54.1-2400(14) (Supp. 2003).
55. Id. Consent agreements "shall include findings of fact," and "may include an ad-
mission or a finding of a violation," and "may be [used] in future disciplinary proceedings."
Id. A practitioner whose certificate, registration, or license to practice has been revoked is
ineligible for reinstatement for three years. Id. § 54.1-2408.2 (Supp. 2003). The new law
also expands the authority of the Department of Health Professions to regulate unlicensed
practice and directs the Department of Health Professions to investigate all complaints
within the jurisdiction of the relevant health regulatory board. Id. §§ 54.1-2505, -2506
(Supp. 2003). Hospitals and other health-care institutions and associations are required to
report certain instances of unethical, fraudulent, or unprofessional conduct, with an excep-
tion for information obtained under peer review. Id. §§ 54.1-2906, -2907, -2908, and -2909
(Repl. Vol. 2002 & Supp. 2003). Finally, the legislation requires the executive committee of
the Board of Medicine to include two citizen members. Id. § 54.1-2911 (Supp. 2003).
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other graduate medical education programs.56 The enhanced
guidelines specifically require a health care provider to obtain in-
formed consent from the patient, when practical, under the condi-
tions in which health care services are being provided, or when
the patient is incapable of making an informed decision, from the
next of kin or a legally authorized representative. 7 However, in-
formed consent must be obtained after informing the consenting
party of which physicians, residents, or interns will perform sur-
gery or another invasive procedure.58 The guidelines also man-
date that the attending physician be present during the surgery
except in an emergency or other unavoidable situation and man-
date that policies be enacted to avoid situations in which a sur-
geon, intern, or resident represents that he or she will perform a
surgery or other invasive procedure and then fails to do so." In
addition, the guidelines require health care entities to create poli-
cies addressing informed consent and the ethics of appropriate
care of patients in the emergency room.6° The Virginia Code re-
quires the board to take into consideration the American Medical
Association's non-binding ban on using newly dead patients as
training subjects without the consent of the next of kin or other
legal representative.6 1
5. Use of Health Records in Administrative Proceedings
In 2003 the General Assembly amended the subpoena provi-
sions in patient records law to make them consistent with federal
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),62 relating to
standards for security and privacy of protected health informa-
tion. The amended statute now applies to subpoenas duces te-
cum for medical records in administrative proceedings, as well as
56. Id. § 54.1-2961(E) (Supp. 2003).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2001).
63. Act of Apr. 2, 2003, ch. 983, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). For a more detailed discussion of HIPAA, see
Kathleen M. McCauley, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Health Care Law, 38 U. RICH. L.
REV. 137, 148 (2003).
2003]
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judicial proceedings.64 The provisions apply to subpoenaed medi-
cal records of parties, as well as non-party witnesses.65 The new
statute requires an agency, or party seeking medical records in
an administrative proceeding, to comply with certain procedural
requirements intended to safeguard patient medical records.66
Under the statute, a party seeking a subpoena duces tecum for
medical records has an affirmative duty to determine whether the
patient whose records are being sought is a pro se party or a non-
party witness. 67 The party requesting or issuing a subpoena of a
pro se party or non-party witness must provide the person with a
copy of the subpoena and a notice informing him of his rights to
file a motion to quash.6' A copy of the subpoena and the notice
must be sent to the patient's counsel, if they are represented.69 In
order to provide the patient or his counsel with a meaningful op-
portunity to respond to the subpoena duces tecum, including the
filing of a motion to quash, no subpoena for medical records may
set a return date of less than fifteen days except by order of a
court or agency for good cause.
70
A health care provider must respond in three ways. First, the
provider may file a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum
within fifteen days of the date of the subpoena, provided, how-
ever, that the provider still file the records with the agency or
court under seal.7 Second, if the provider has actually received
notice that a motion to quash has been filed, the provider must
file the records with the agency or court under seal.72 Third, if no
motion to quash is filed, the provider must file the documents
with the agency or court within the fifteen-day period or within
five days after receiving a certification that the time has elapsed
and no motion to quash was filed.73 The party seeking the docu-
ments has an affirmative duty to certify that no motion to quash
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
67. Id. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(2)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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was filed.74 The statute also contains provisions for resolving a
motion to quash, and expressly preserves the authority of courts
and agencies to issue protective orders regarding medical re-
cords .
III. THE COURTS
There were several notable judicial decisions during the period,
and as is typical, many more decisions that were routine.76
A. Standing
The law of standing determines who may petition for judicial
review of agency action. Federal judicial authority is derived from
Article III of the Constitution, which grants jurisdiction to courts
74. Id. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
75. Id. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(7)-(9) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
76. See, e.g., Bender v. Marine Res. Comm., No. 1783-02-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 253,
at *3, 4-5 (Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2003) (unpublished decision) (affirming the trial court's award
of attorney fees and the trial court's dismissal of the action for failure to properly serve
process on the administrative agency); Ables v. Rivero, No. 0973-02-1, 2003 Va. App.
LEXIS 83 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2003) (unpublished decision) (affirming the trial court's deci-
sion including the trial court's finding of child abuse); Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd. v. Morgan,
38 Va. App. 665, 671-72, 568 S.E.2d 378, 381 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover statutory attorney's fees for the proceedings in the trial court
and holding that attorney's fees could be awarded as part of the judgment by the Motor
Vehicle Board and funded by the Motor Vehicle Transaction Recovery Fund Act); May
Dept. Stores v. Commonwealth, No. 3356-01-2, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 443, at *7-8 (Ct.
App. Aug. 6, 2002) (unpublished decision) (reversing the trial court because the agency
relied on a post hoc rationale on appeal and the underlying agency decision was arbitrary
and capricious); Leighton v. Dept. of Health, No. 1328-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 338, at
*2 (Ct. App. June 11, 2002) (unpublished decision) (holding that the appellant lacked
standing and was not an aggrieved party); Kennedy v. Comm'r of DMV, 61 Va. Cir. 294,
__ (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Fairfax County) (holding that the court had no authority to hear the
plaintiffs petition); Dick's Inn v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 60 Va. Cir. 407, 410-12
(Cir. Ct. 2002) (Richmond City) (holding that the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board did not abuse its discretion to deny a request for license modification within twelve
months after the license is issued); Stearns v. Va. Marine Res. Comm., 60 Va. Cir. 296,
298-99 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Norfolk City) (holding that the court had no authority to reinstate
the case, to thwart possible agency review by the Norfolk Wetlands Board on remand, be-
cause the court entered a final order dismissing the case more than twenty-one days
prior); Bryden v. Motor Vehicle Dealer Bd., 60 Va. Cir. 279, 284-85 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Arling-
ton County) (dismissing the appeal of a motor vehicle dealer's license revocation); River-
side Hosp. v. Stroube, 61 Va. Cir. 331, __ (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Williamsburg City and James
City County) (refusing to modify an agreed-upon briefing order in order to permit rebuttal
brief in appeal of an agency decision).
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over "cases" and "controversies."77 In Virginia, standing is con-
ferred by statute, rather than by constitution, and the legislature
has typically meted out standing in small doses.
However, the distinction between federal Article III standing
and standing in a Virginia state court is no longer quite so sharp.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia evidences that
shift.
Virginia Code section 62.1-44.29 essentially adopts Article III
standing for regulations and permits adopted or issued by the
State Water Control Board ("SWCB").7s The law provides in per-
tinent part:
[any owner aggrieved by, or any person who has participated, in
person or by submittal of written comments, in the public comment
process related to, a final decision of the [State Water Control]
Board... is entitled to judicial review thereof in accordance with the
provisions of the Administrative Process Act... if such person meets
the standard for obtaining judicial review of a case or controversy
pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution. A person
shall be deemed to meet such standard if (i) such person has suffered
an actual or imminent injury which is an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest and which is concrete and particularized; (ii) such in-
jury is fairly traceable to the decision of the Board and not the result
of the independent action of some third party not before the court;
and (iii) such injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision
by the court.
79
State Water Control Board v. Crutchfield0 provided the Su-
preme Court of Virginia with a perfect example to illustrate the
first prong of this analysis-whether the injury is "actual or im-
minent.""l
In Crutchfield, Hanover County sought a Virginia Pollution
Discharge Elimination System Permit from the SWCB to dis-
charge up to ten million gallons of wastewater per day into the
Pamunkey River, adjacent to an historic farm owned by Mrs.
Crutchfield and her son.82 The Crutchfield farm stretched along
several miles of the Pamunkey River and contained the relics of a
77. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
78. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
79. Id.
80. 265 Va. 416, 578 S.E.2d 762 (2003).
81. Id. at 426, 578 S.E.2d 767.
82. Id. at 421-22, 578 S.E.2d at 765.
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colonial village listed as a Virginia Historic Landmark and a for-
mer plantation listed in the National Historic Landmark Regis-
try. 3 To effectuate the project, Hanover County acquired, by con-
demnation, a fifty-foot wide easement through the center of the
farm. 4 The easement was planned to accommodate a thirty-six-
inch diameter wastewater pipeline. 8" The project required obtain-
ing river frontage from the farm to construct discharge struc-
tures.8 6 Wastewater would be pumped from eight miles away and
discharged to the river bottom, fifty yards upstream from the
landowners' boat ramp, irrigation pump, and "'picnic-swimming
area.
,
"
87
The landowners were not pleased with this prospective devel-
opment. They participated in the public hearing held by the
SWCB, and submitted written comments in opposition to the pro-
ject.8 The written comments alleged that the project would inter-
fere with existing recreational uses of the river.8 9 They stated the
area immediately downstream from the discharge point had been
used "'for swimming for many years. Those using [the river] are
not limited to the property owners."'9° Their letter noted the "'sig-
nificant, documented historic resources that would indeed be ad-
versely affected by [the project] ."'
Against this backdrop, the Board requested to depose the peti-
tioners as to their standing.92 Mrs. Crutchfield testified that she
would "no longer swim, fish, or canoe in the river" if the project
went forward, and that the enjoyment she derives from camping
adjacent to the river would be "impaired."93 Her son testified that
the presence of the pipeline would "hinder his enjoyment of' the
farm's recreational amenities and cause him to "abandon or de-
crease the frequency of his recreational activities in the river." '
83. Id. at 421, 578 S.E.2d at 764.
84. Id. at 422, 578 S.E.2d at 765.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 422-423, 578 S.E.2d at 765.
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The circuit court dismissed the appeal, holding that the peti-
tioners failed to demonstrate 'any actual or imminent injury,"'
and holding that their claims were no more than 'abstract dis-
tress."'95 The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed and remanded
for hearing on the merits, holding in an unpublished opinion that
the petitioners had standing.96
On writ to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Board assailed
the court of appeals' conclusion as to standing and its alleged
failure to defer to the circuit court's "'factual findings."'97 The su-
preme court disagreed and held that the petitioners established
standing under the statute.98
The court held that the language of Virginia Code section 62.1-
44.29 "reflects the holdings of the United States Supreme Court
regarding the requirements of standing under the 'case' or 'con-
troversy' provisions of Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion."99 Citing to volumes of Supreme Court of the United States'
precedent, the court held that the "injury in fact" required in rec-
reational and aesthetics interests cases must be personal, not just
environmental. The injury "need not be a large one"-an 'identi-
fiable trifle' is enough.100 Moreover, the court held it sufficient for
a plaintiff to establish that he "uses" the area and that he is "a
person 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area
will be lessened' if the project succeeds. 101
The Crutchfield case is not purely a statutory analysis decision.
It borrows an element of Virginia common law-the notion of ri-
parian rights dating from the Magna Charta and perhaps before.
At common law, the jus privatum (private rights) rest in the
landowner adjoining public waters, including the rights to "make
reasonable use of the water flowing past their land" and "to enjoy
95. Id. at 421, 578 S.E. 2d at 764.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 426, 578 S.E.2d at 767.
98. Id. at 428, 578 S.E.2d at 768.
99. Id. at 426, 578 S.E.2d at 767 (citing Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Commonwealth,
261 Va. 366, 376, 541 S.E.2d 920, 925 (2001)); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Repl.
Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
100. Crutchfield, 265 Va. at 427, 578 S.E.2d at 768 (citations omitted).
101. Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 38:39
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
the recreational and aesthetic advantages that are conferred on
such land adjoining a watercourse."1 °2
In Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Quillian,°3 the Supreme Court of
Virginia entertained a certified question from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia regarding the
standing of an existing motorcycle dealer to challenge a franchise
for a new (and competing) dealer of the same line and make of
motorcycles. °4 The Commissioner interpreted Virginia Code sec-
tion 46.2-1993.67(5) to permit existing dealers to protest new
dealerships only if they offered the same line and were made in
the county, city, or town in which the proposed new dealer was to
be located.0 ' While the supreme court deferred generally to the
Commissioner's interpretation of the statute, it held that limiting
standing to dealers with the particular county, city, or town of the
proposed new dealer "'invites absurd outcomes,"' such as the case
where a new dealer would be located only a few blocks away, but
in a different jurisdiction than, the existing dealer.0 6 Accordingly,
the court held that the proper construction of the statute would
be to limit standing to dealers in the market area likely to be
served by the new dealer.0 7
B. Evidentiary Standards and Standards of Review
Administrative law practitioners argue over the applicable evi-
dentiary standard and standards of review as a matter of course.
This is especially true because agency findings are accorded
"great deference."0 8
102. Id. at 427-28, 578 S.E.2d at 768 (citing Cann v. Kidd, 261 Va. 81, 95, 540 S.E.2d
884, 892-93 (2001); Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 910-11, 140 S.E.2d 678,
680 (1965); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 773, 47 S.E. 875, 880-81 (1904)).
103. 264 Va. 656, 571 S.E.2d 122 (2002). For additional discussion of Yamaha Motor
Corp., see Michael F. Urbanski et al., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 59, 78 (2003).
104. Yamaha Motor Corp., 264 Va. at 660, 571 S.E.2d at 123-24.
105. Id. at 660, 571 S.E.2d at 124; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1993.67(5) (Repl. Vol.
2002 & Supp. 2003).
106. Yamaha Motor Corp., 264 Va. at 666, 571 S.E.2d at 127.
107. Id. at 665, 571 S.E.2d at 127.
108. Atkinson v. Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 1 Va. App. 172, 178, 336
S.E.2d 527, 531 (Ct. App. 1985).
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In Goad v. Virginia Board of Medicine,"' the Court of Appeals
of Virginia confronted the Board of Medicine's decision to take
disciplinary action against a physician for "unprofessional con-
duct."1 ' The basis of the alleged conduct was sexual harass-
ment."' Following informal counseling and interim reviews by
the hospital where he was a resident, the hospital found the re-
spondent to be "'very good' in his clinical performance, but the
hospital closely monitored him." 2 Upon further allegations of
"improper conduct," the hospital disciplined him, and the Board
of Medicine brought charges." 3 The court, assuming that a pre-
ponderance of the evidence was necessary to establish the re-
spondent's guilt,"4 held that the Board of Medicine established no
evidence it had promulgated any standards of ethics applicable to
the respondent's case, including standards adopted by the Ameri-
can Medical Association or the American Psychiatric Association,
both of which were introduced by the Commonwealth as exhibits,
but neither of which were asserted to be binding on the Board of
Medicine." 5 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and
remanded with instructions to set aside the Board of Medicine's
order, finding no substantial evidence to support the agency deci-
sion.1 16
Little and Tall, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board..7 pre-
sented similar issues concerning construction of the statutory
evidentiary standard and judicial deference to the agency's find-
ings." There, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board conducted a
series of undercover operations in licensed establishments to de-
termine whether illegal drug use was occurring on the prem-
ises." 9 The evidence consisted of five alleged instances where
government informants purchased drugs on the premises or made
arrangements for purchases outside the premises. 20 In three of
109. 40 Va. App. 621, 580 S.E.2d 494 (Ct. App. 2003).
110. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2914(A)(7) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
111. Goad, 40 Va. App. at 624-28, 580 S.E.2d at 496-97.
112. Id. at 626, 580 S.E.2d at 496-97.
113. Id. at 626-28, 580 S.E.2d at 497.
114. Id. at 635 n.10, 580 S.E.2d at 501 n.10.
115. Id. at 636-37, 580 S.E.2d at 501-02.
116. Id. at 638, 580 S.E.2d at 502-03.
117. 59 Va. Cir. 212 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Richmond City).
118. Id. at 213-14.
119. Id. at 212.
120. Id. at 213.
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the five cases, the informant simply entered the premises and
made the purchases or arrangements to purchase; in two, the in-
formant pre-arranged to meet an alleged dealer there to make the
buy. 121 There was no evidence that the licensee/respondent had
any knowledge of the transactions-in fact the evidence showed
that he had "significant security" and had undertaken reasonable
efforts to prevent illegal conduct from occurring on the prem-
* 122ises.
The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board charged the respondent
with maintaining "a meeting place or rendezvous for illegal users
of narcotics and/or habitual law violators."123 The court did not de-
fer to the agency's interpretation of "meeting place or rendez-
vous," instead resorting to plain English statutory construction
and prior case law to find that both "meeting place" and "rendez-
vous" imply that the parties must have prearranged or pre-
designated the place in order for it to be such.'24 In addition, the
court drew an analogy to the crime of conspiracy and held that a
government informant cannot supply an essential element of the
crime.125 The court held that "it is inherent that one person can-
not meet or rendezvous alone."1 26 Thus there was insufficient evi-
dence in the record to support the charges and the agency was re-
versed. 127
Kirin Brewery of America v. Virginia Imports Ltd.12 involved
the idiosyncrasies of Virginia's alcoholic beverage franchise
laws. 29 Generally speaking, once a manufacturer appoints a dis-
tributor, it may terminate the appointment only for good cause
and in good faith and after exhausting its administrative reme-
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 212; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-225(2)(c) (Cum Supp. 2002). The General
Assembly subsequently amended Virginia Code section 4.1-225(2)(c) to add, as a grounds
for a violation, that the place occupied by the licensee "has become a place where illegal
drugs are regularly used or distributed." Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 594, 2003 Va. Act __
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1- 2 25(2)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
124. Little and Tall, Inc., 59 Va. Cir. at 214.
125. Id. at 214-15.
126. Id. at 214.
127. Id. at 215.
128. 60 Va. Cir. 151 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Fairfax County). For additional discussion of
Kirin, see Urbanski et al., supra note 103, at 79.
129. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-500 to -577 (Rep. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
dies at the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.131 In application,
this is a difficult standard.
In Kirin, the brewery alleged that one of its distributors failed
to adequately service the account by leaving stale beer on retail
shelves, among other things. 131 The brewery notified the distribu-
tor that it intended to terminate the distributorship agreement
for cause and complied with the statutory requirement to serve a
copy on the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.1 32 The distributor
responded to the brewery that it had cured the deficiencies cited
in the termination letter, but failed to mail a copy of the cure let-
ter to the Board, as required by statute. 133 The brewery requested
a hearing before the Board under the statute.'34 The Secretary of
the Board ("Secretary"), not having received a copy of the statuto-
rily mandated cure letter within the ninety-day period, advised
the brewery that the distributorship agreement was effectively
terminated and that the brewery was free to appoint other dis-
tributors. 35
The distributor protested and, after neither the Secretary nor
the Board agreed to reinstate the distributor, the Secretary re-
ferred the matter to a hearing panel.'36 The panel found for the
distributor, and the Board later found that the distributor had
substantially complied with the brewery's freshness policy, that
the brewery consequently lacked "good faith" to terminate, and
that the brewery had acted in bad faith by terminating the dis-
tributor when it had received the distributor's cure letter and,
nonetheless, proceeded to terminate the agreement. 37 The circuit
court reversed, holding that the brewery had complied with the
specific statutory procedures for terminating the agreement and
that the distributor's failure to provide the Board with a copy of
the cure letter was jurisdictional. 13 Consequently, the agreement
130. Id. §§ 4.5-505, -506 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
131. Kirin, 60 Va. Cir. at 152.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 153.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 157.
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terminated by operation of law, and the Board lacked jurisdiction
to hear the matter.
139
IV. CONCLUSION
The General Assembly and the courts of the Commonwealth of
Virginia continued developing and interpreting administrative
law and procedure in 2002 and 2003. Statutory changes made by
the General Assembly include the implementation of fast-track
rulemaking, direct shipment of alcoholic beverages being permit-
ted to residents of the Commonwealth, expanded authority of the
Virginia Racing Commission, a new disciplinary standard of sim-
ple negligence for licensed health care practitioners, and updated
subpoena provisions in patient records law. The courts of Virginia
reviewed the issues of standing, evidentiary standards, and stan-
dards of review in an ongoing effort to resolve the debate over
who can challenge agency decisions and how those decisions
should be considered upon judicial review.
139. Id.
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